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Abstract
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties–United States: This 6,000-word essay, to be pub-
lished in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Legal History, considers several issues con-
cerning civil rights and civil liberties in the United States. First, it notes several
problems with deﬁning the topic. Second, it examines the historical conditions
under which particular rights have gained popularity. Finally, the essay consid-
ers several issues involving the judicial enforcement of rights: the inclination and
capacity of courts to defend unpopular rights; the enforceability of court deci-
sions protecting rights; the unpredictable consequences of such rulings; and the
characteristics of a right that render courts most likely to protect it.1
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This essay considers several issues concerning civil rights and civil liberties (hereinafter, 
“rights”) in the United States.  First, it notes several problems with defining the topic.  Second, it 
examines the historical conditions under which particular rights have gained popularity.  Finally, 
the essay considers several issues involving the judicial enforcement of rights: the inclination 
and capacity of courts to defend unpopular rights; the enforceability of court decisions protecting 
rights; the unpredictable consequences of such rulings; and the characteristics of a right that 
render courts most likely to protect it.  
Definitional problems
All definitions of rights are problematic for at least three reasons.  First, identifying the 
types of individual interests that ought to be protected from governmental interference is 
inevitably controversial.  All laws prevent some people from engaging in certain types of 
behavior, and life in organized society would hardly be possible if government could not restrict 
certain individual actions.  Still unsettled, however, is the questio n of which individual interests 
should qualify as rights, and thus be free from government regulation.  
Two sample definitions illustrate this difficulty.  That espoused by libertarians identifies 
as protected rights individual behavior that inflicts no harm on third parties.  Yet defining what 
qualifies as cognizable third-party harm is itself controversial.  For example, does the offense 
that one person may feel at simply knowing that others are engaged in certain behavior count as 
third-party harm?  Moreover, few Americans would condemn all governmental regulation of 
behavior that inflicts no direct third-party harm.  Mandatory seat-belt laws, motorcycle-helmet 
laws, and prohibitions on certain kinds of drug use are broadly accepted.
Another controversial method of identifying rights focuses exclusively on those that are 
enumerated in the Constitution.  However, that document itself seems to foreclose this option by 
expressly denying–in the Ninth Amendment–that the enumeration of certain rights shall be
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“construed to deny or disparage [the existence of] others.”   Moreover, a purely texualist method 
of identifying rights denies the possibility of “natural” rights that exist independently of 
government.  Such an approach also limits future generations to the rights that were identified as 
important by the founding generation, unless a supermajority of the population can be mobilized 
to amend the Constitution to create additional rights.  Yet different generations have valued 
different rights.  For example, the rights to control one’s reproductive choices and to choose 
one’s sex partners have only recently been deemed fundamental.  Why should the protection of 
such rights be foreclosed today simply because they were deemed unimportant–at least by 
affluent white men–two hundred years ago?  
The second problem with defining rights has to do with their negative and positive 
dimensions.  Negative liberty is freedom from governmental interference.  Positive liberty is the 
existence of conditions that enable individuals to realize their potential or accomplish their 
objectives.  These conditions may be attainable only through governmental intervention.  
Although some would treat the negative conception of liberty as axiomatic, both conceptions of 
rights have attracted support throughout American history.  Even the founding generation, for 
example, would have regarded government’s failure to protect against private trespasses on land 
as an interference with property rights, even though this is in fact a positive conception of liberty.  
So long as both positive and negative conceptions of rights have supporters, rights arguments are 
sure to exist on both sides of every significant policy dispute.  Pro-choice advocates want women 
to be free from governmental interference with their reproductive choices; abortion opponents 
want the government to guarantee fetuses the right to life.  The National Rifle Association wants 
citizens to be free from governmental interference with the right to keep and bear arms; residents 
of urban neighborhoods want the government to regulate guns so that they may exercise the right 
to walk their streets without constant fear of gun-related violence.  
A third problem with defining rights involves the tension between a community’s 
collective right to self-determination through the political process and an individual’s right to be 
free from undue governmental interference.  The individual right of women to reproductive 
choice is in tension with the political right of democratic majorities to regulate abortion.  The 
individual right of gays and lesbians to be free of governmental discrimination based on sexual 
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orientation is in tension with the political right of democratic majorities to define the moral 
boundaries of their community.  
For these three reasons, any definition of rights is bound to be contested.  
Why Rights Expand
Definitional problems aside, particular rights have undeniably expanded over time.  The 
right of free speech and the right against racial discrimination are more broadly defined and 
solidly protected today than they were a century ago.  Under what conditions do rights expand? 
Certain rights may become more attractive when associated with political causes that 
have gained popularity.  During the first half of the twentieth century, for example, freedom of 
speech was closely identified with the labor movement; it generally connoted the right of labor 
unions to organize, picket, and boycott.  As a result of the Great Depression and the New Deal, 
the political and social status of organized labor grew tremendously in the 1930s.  By decade’s 
end, the Supreme Court for the first time had extended First Amendment protection to such labor 
union activity as organizing, picketing, and pamphleteering.  Similarly, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
free speech became intertwined with another burgeoning cause: the civil rights movement.  Not 
coincidentally, many of the landmark free speech decisions of the Warren Court derived from 
civil rights controversies.  That Court’s criminal procedure rulings further illustrate the point.  
Most criminal defendants are poor, and a disproportionate number are members of minority 
racial groups.  The 1960s witnessed both a civil rights movement and a War on Poverty, and 
many justices of the Warren Court conceived of criminal procedure issues in terms of race and 
wealth discrimination.  
Certain rights also seem to expand during wartime–an ironic connection, given that the 
short-term consequence of war is often a constriction of liberty.  Examples of wars restricting 
rights are legion.  The military detention and trial of civilians was widespread during the Civil 
War.  Federal prosecutions under the Sedition and Espionage Acts of 1917-1918 suppressed 
criticism of the Wilson administration’s conduct of World War I, and during World War II 
Japanese Americans were evicted from their West Coast homes and relocated to internment 
camps.  Yet wars have also advanced rights in the longer term, especially by expanding the pool 
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of beneficiaries.  The Revolutionary War led to the emancipation of slaves by northern states and 
a temporary increase in individual manumissions in some southern states.  The Civil War not 
only emancipated the slaves but also expanded the civil and political rights of freedpersons.  
Women received the right to vote through federal constitutional amendment during World War I.  
The second world war inspired the modern civil rights movement and proved fertile ground for 
speech rights, especially those of labor unions and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
Wars may advance particular rights for several reasons.  First, Americans tend to define 
their war aims in democratic terms.  The purpose of World War I was “to make the world safe 
for democracy,” and the objective of World War II was to defeat fascism.  To be sure, most 
white southerners supported a war against fascism without sacrificing their own commitment to 
white supremacy.  Yet other Americans, less invested in Jim Crow, saw inconsistency in fighting 
Nazi doctrines of Aryan supremacy with a racially segregated army.  Supreme Court justices, 
unable to reconcile the war’s democratic ideology with the continued disfranchisement of 
southern blacks, invalidated the exclusion of blacks from Democratic Party primaries in 1944.  
Invoking thinly veiled references to eugenic experiments by Nazi scientists, the Court in 1942 
declared unconstitutional the sterilization of recidivist criminals.  In 1940 the justices, alluding 
disparagingly to the law enforcement tactics of totalitarian regimes, reversed criminal 
convictions that had been obtained through the use of psychologically coerced confessions.
The social upheaval produced by war has also promoted the expansion of certain rights 
by undermining traditional patterns of status and behavior.  The Civil War, of course, entailed a 
cataclysmic disruption of the existing racial order.  The women’s suffrage movement, which had 
long failed in its efforts to amend the federal constitution to enfranchise women, triumphed 
during World War I, when military and industrial mobilization reduced the male labor supply 
and forced popular acceptance of women in nontraditional economic and social roles.  Similarly, 
the extraordinary personnel demands of World War II created new civil and military 
opportunities for African Americans, thus accelerating the demise of traditional patterns of racial 
subordination.  Blacks moved from the South to the North and from farms to cities, enhancing 
their political power and their ability to organize social protest.  Many returning black soldiers 
refused to endure Jim Crow any longer.  The war also upended the international political order, 
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liberating African and Asian nations from colonialism and forcing Americans to choose between 
abandoning white supremacy and sacrificing their pretensions to world leadership.  
Lastly, because war generally involves common sacrifice for the general good, it has 
inescapably egalitarian implications.  The sacrifices made by former slaves on Civil War 
battlefields helped secure postwar constitutional amendments guaranteeing blacks basic civil and 
political rights.  The military contributions of Catholics during World War I accelerated their 
assimilation into America’s cultural mainstream.  If African Americans were good enough to 
fight and die for their country during World War II, then they were surely good enough to vote 
and to deserve federal government protection from lynching and other racially motivated 
violence.
Nor are wars and social reform movements the only contexts in which rights flourish.  
Paradoxically, rights have also expanded as a result of overzealous opposition to them.  The 
Sedition Act of 1798, which Federalists enforced aggressively against Jeffersonian critics of the 
Adams administration, apparently generated a backlash against seditious-libel prosecutions and 
in favor of freedom of speech.  Mob violence against abolitionist speakers and newspaper editors 
in northern states during the 1830s–violence that included tarring and feathering, the destruction 
of printing presses, and even murder–produced a countermovement favoring freedom of speech 
for antislavery agitators.  Two thousand criminal prosecutions under the Espionage and Sedition 
Acts during World War I–targeting not only anarchists and communists but also socialists, 
pacifists, and civil libertarian critics of the Wilson administration–inspired the creation of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and probably facilitated the Supreme Court’s expansion of free 
speech rights a decade later.  The Nazi Holocaust ironically fostered religious toleration for 
American Jews.  Most famously, nationally televised scenes of police brutality against civil 
rights demonstrators in Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, repulsed northern viewers and 
inspired the enactment of landmark civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965.  
Conditions under which courts enforce rights
A variety of governmental institutions have the capacity to identify and protect rights.  
One typically thinks of courts as the primary guardians of rights, but legislatures and executives 
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fill that role as well.  An executive order by President Harry S Truman first created a right to be 
free from race discrimination in the federal military and civil service.  In 1964 Congress created 
a right against racial discrimination in private employment and in public accommodations.  Yet 
even those rights first recognized elsewhere generally depend on the courts for their ultimate 
enforcement.  Moreover, political officers are commonly thought to be less likely than judges to 
protect rights that are not supported by public opinion.  In Chambers v.  Florida (1940), Justice 
Hugo Black proudly proclaimed the special obligation of courts to “stand against any winds that 
blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, 
outnumbered or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.” 
Yet history reveals that judges have little inclination or capacity to play this heroic 
countermajoritarian role.  Because judges are themselves products of contemporary culture, they 
are unlikely to interpret the Constitution in ways that deviate significantly from prevailing views. 
Thus, the Supreme Court not only failed to take steps to end the greatest interference with rights 
in American history–African-American slavery–but actually intervened several times in defense 
of the institution.  Likewise, the Court upheld racial segregation and black disfranchisement 
during most of the Jim Crow era, sustained seditious-libel prosecutions during World War I, 
validated Japanese-American internment during World War II, sanctioned the persecution of 
political leftists during the McCarthy era, and upheld government-mandated sex discrimination 
until after the emergence of the women’s movement in the late 1960s.  
The perhaps inevitable tendency of jurists to side with the majority has a natural ally in 
the conventional sources of constitutional law.  Those sources–such as text, original 
understanding, precedent, and custom–are usually vague enough to accommodate dominant 
public opinion.  When the Court decided Plessy v.  Ferguson (1896), for example, these legal 
sources did not plainly bar racial segregation.  “Separate but equal” seemed consistent with 
“equal protection”; the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment seemed to tolerate 
segregation; and judicial precedent strongly supported the practice.  At a time when most white 
Americans favored racial segregation, the justices in Plessy easily sustained it.  
The judicial accession to majority views, whether conscious or otherwise, means that 
oppressed minority groups most in need of judicial protection are least likely to receive it.  
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Groups must command significant social, political, and economic power before they become 
attractive candidates for judicial solicitude.  The justices would not have dreamed of protecting 
women or gays under the Equal Protection Clause before the women’s movement and the gay 
rights movement.  Similarly, the Court objected to racial segregation and black disfranchisement 
only after African Americans became a vital New Deal constituency and began to achieve 
middle-class status and professional success, earning federal judgeships, a Nobel Peace Prize, 
and a military generalship.  Justice Felix Frankfurter once noted that had a school segregation 
case reached the Court in the 1940s, he would have voted to sustain the practice because “public 
opinion had not then crystallized against it.” 
Judges lack not only the inclination but also the institutional capacity to protect 
unpopular minority groups.  In Giles v.  Harris (1903), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes conceded 
that even if Alabama law disfranchised blacks in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
Court was powerless to provide a remedy, which must come instead from the political branches 
of the national government.  In Korematsu v.  United States (1944), Justice Robert H. Jackson’s 
dissent insisted that the Court was powerless to interfere with military operations during World 
War II, including the eviction of Japanese Americans from their West Coast homes.  When the 
Court invalidated school segregation in 1954, its subsequent remedial order condoned delay 
because the justices feared the consequences of issuing an unenforceable ruling and because they 
doubted, with good reason, the willingness of Congress and the president to enforce an order for 
immediate desegregation.
The limited inclination and capacity of judges to frustrate dominant public opinion 
explains why so many of the Court’s famous decisions protecting rights do little more than 
convert a national consensus into a constitutional command that brings into line a few renegade 
states.  Griswold v.  Connecticut  (1965), which ruled that the Constitution protects the right of 
married couples to use contraceptives in the privacy of their bedrooms, invalidated the laws of 
only two states.  Pierce v.  Society of Sisters (1925), which announced that parents have a 
constitutional right to send their children to private schools, affected the laws of only one state.  
Numerous landmark Court rulings have implicated the laws of only a handful of (often southern) 
states that had persisted in rejecting a strong national consensus: Lawrence v.  Texas (2003) (the 
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right of consenting adults to participate in homosexual sex in the privacy of their bedrooms); 
Plyler v.  Doe (1982) (the right of children of illegal aliens to receive public education); Coker v.  
Georgia (1977) (the right not to be executed for commission of the crime of rape); Harper v.  
Virginia Board of Elections (1966) (the right to vote without paying a poll tax); Gideon v.  
Wainwright (1963) (the right of indigent defendants charged with felonies to state-appointed 
counsel); and Smith v.  Allwright (1944) (the right of blacks to participate in Democratic Party 
primaries).  Courts are far more likely to bring outlier states into conformity than to rescue 
powerless minorities from majoritarian oppression.
Even in the civil rights context, courts played a more passive role than is commonly 
appreciated.  Brown v.  Board of Education (1954), the most celebrated civil rights decision of 
all time, was rendered possible only by the dramatic changes in racial attitudes and practices that 
were inaugurated or accelerated by World War II.  In the 1920s, when a decision invalidating 
public school segregation would have been dramatically countermajoritarian, the justices 
unanimously–and casually–endorsed the practice.  Nor did Brown, once decided, produce 
significant results before the political branches of the national government had mobilized behind
it.  That mobilization was a result of the civil rights movement, not of Brown, and the former had 
less to do with the latter than is commonly supposed.
To be sure, the Court does occasionally protect rights that do not command majority 
support–for example, the right of public school students to be free from collective religious 
observances and the procedural rights of criminal defendants.  Yet even these rulings came only 
after strong majoritarian opposition had declined.  The Court invalidated prayer and Bible 
reading in the public schools only after the evisceration of America’s unofficial Protestant 
establishment.  The criminal procedure revolution of the Warren Court was a result of shifting 
public attitudes toward race and poverty and of revulsion toward the law enforcement practices 
of totalitarian regimes.  
Effectiveness of judicial enforcement 
Even when courts declare the existence of a right, effective enforcement does not 
automatically follow.  Numerous factors influence the efficacy with which rights are 
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implemented.  When the beneficiaries of a right are united and impassioned, judicial 
enforcement is likely to be more efficacious.  Smith v.  Allwright, which invalidated the white 
primary, had a more immediate and sizable effect on black voter registration than Brown had on 
school desegregation, in part because southern blacks were more committed to procuring voting 
rights than integrated schools.  Many southern blacks calculated that the right to vote would 
secure other rights through political action.  By contrast, they were divided over the desirability 
of integrated education because segregated schools offered several advantages: job opportunities 
for black teachers at a time when few white-collar occupations were open to blacks, an 
educational environment relatively free from the stereotyping and humiliation that black children 
often experienced in integrated schools, and more sympathetic portrayals of black history and 
culture.
Another factor that influences the efficacy of rights enforcement is the intensity of 
opponents’ resistance.  Southern whites were less resistant to black suffrage and to the 
desegregation of higher education than they were to the desegregation of grade schools.  By the 
1940s many moderate whites in the South favored removing barriers to black political 
participation; black disfranchisement was comparatively difficult to justify in light of advances 
in black education and the democratic ideology of World War II.  Many southern whites also 
supported black efforts to desegregate professional and graduate schools.  By contrast, most 
white southerners adamantly opposed grade school desegregation, which involved young 
children, male and female, and thus for most whites connoted eventual miscegenation.
The enforceability of constitutional rights also varies according to the ease with which 
deprivations can be established.  White southerners discovered early on that the most effective 
way to evade federal constitutional mandates was to delegate discretion to local administrators, 
who could maintain white supremacy without openly violating the Constitution.  This is how 
southern blacks were excluded from jury service, disfranchised, and denied their fair share of 
public education funds.  As blacks became better educated, however, voter registrars had a 
harder time seriously maintaining that black applicants had flunked literacy tests routinely passed 
by less well-educated whites.  By contrast, a black defendant who crossed swords at trial with a 
white sheriff over whether his confession was voluntarily given found himself hard pressed to 
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convince white fact finders that his account was true.  The attractiveness of rights-bearers also 
affects enforceability.  Whites found it more difficult to empathize with black criminal 
defendants–indigent, often illiterate, frequently guilty of some crime even if not of the one 
charged–than with middle-class, well-educated blacks who endeavored to vote or attend public 
universities after World War II.
The relative availability of sanctions against violators also influences the enforcement of 
rights.  Before the 1960s, law enforcement officers and jury commissioners had few incentives to 
respect the constitutional rights of black criminal defendants because civil and criminal sanctions 
were generally unavailable.  By contrast, after Smith v. Allwright, voter registrars and party 
officials who refused to allow blacks to vote in party primaries were vulnerable, at least 
theoretically, to federal criminal sanctions.  Recent precedents had also authorized civil suits for 
damages in voting rights cases.  One reason that southern school boards successfully resisted 
Brown for so long is that the first school desegregation lawsuits never sought money damages, 
because of the well-founded supposition that white jurors in the South would not impose liability 
on public officials for resisting school desegregation.  Indeed, the constitutional guarantee of a 
jury trial before the imposition of significant criminal or civil liability can be a huge impediment 
to the enforcement of any right that is unpopular in a locality.  
Whether enforcement is sought by public or private means also affects a right’s 
implementation; public enforcement is likely to be more efficacious.  To be sure, the disparity is 
due in part to the fact that governmental actors rarely mobilize in support of a principle without 
the backing of the public at large.  But the Justice Department and state and local prosecutors 
command far greater resources than do individual litigants, while bearing comparatively few 
risks.  Thus, the pace of public school desegregation accelerated dramatically after the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act authorized suits by the Attorney General.  Public enforcement also offers remedial 
options that are typically unavailable to private litigants, such as threats to terminate public 
funding for rights violators.  
Individual litigants, by contrast, not only lack resources and stature but also may face 
economic reprisals, social ostracism, and even physical violence.  Had Plessy v.  Ferguson
(1896) come out the other way, southern railroads would likely have remained segregated, 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art311
because blacks testing a right to nonsegregated travel would have jeopardized their lives in an 
era of rampant white-on-black lynching.  By the 1950s lynchings were nearly obsolete, but civil 
rights litigants risked daunting economic reprisals.  Because they feared retribution, blacks in 
Mississippi did not bring a single school desegregation suit until nearly a decade after Brown. 
 Effective lawyering is also essential to the enforcement of rights.  Civil rights victories 
produced such meager results before World War II in part because few black lawyers practiced 
in the South; those who did were often badly educated and poorly trained.  Most white lawyers 
would not take civil rights cases because of the stigma that attached.  The National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had limited resources, was absent from much 
of the South until the 1940s, and was permitted to intervene only with the assistance of local 
counsel.  Black criminal defendants were usually poor, and the court-appointed lawyers they 
received in capital cases often failed to challenge even clear violations of constitutional rights.  
By contrast, blacks who challenged violations of their voting rights were able to hire their own 
lawyers.  After World War II, more white lawyers were willing to take voting rights cases, and 
more and better-trained black lawyers were practicing in the South.
The problems associated with poor lawyering and private enforcement can, however, be 
offset by the existence of an organization able to capture the benefits of litigation, while 
spreading the costs and the risks.  In the civil rights context, isolated court victories made no 
meaningful difference.  Follow-up litigation was invariably required to implement rights on a 
broader scale, and only a robust NAACP made it possible.  Individual rights claimants, whether 
criminal or civil, can rarely afford the considerable sums necessary to litigate cases through the 
appeals process; civil litigants also face considerable personal costs, such as public opprobrium 
and the near total disruption of their lives.  Only organizations such as the NAACP and the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which represent individuals collectively, can 
effectively orchestrate litigation aimed at social reform.  Without the vast expansion of the 
NAACP during and after World War II, the legal assault on Jim Crow could not have advanced 
very far.  
The nature of the court in which rights violations are litigated also affects enforcement.  
State appellate and federal judges, better educated and more insulated from local opinion than 
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state trial judges, were better able to vindicate the constitutional rights of southern blacks.  
Unfortunately, the cases of black criminal defendants usually did not proceed beyond trial courts, 
primarily because state provision of counsel to the indigent did not generally extend to appeals, 
but also because procedural defaults frequently insulated trial errors from appellate review.  By 
contrast, blacks litigating voting rights violations were free to choose their forum, and they 
usually selected federal court.  They also tended to command the resources necessary to pursue 
appeals to courts that were more likely to sympathize with their claims.  
The clarity of legal instructions formulated by higher courts also influences the 
implementation of rights by lower courts.  Even though most federal judges in the South thought 
Brown was wrongheaded, their sense of professional obligation generally deterred them from 
openly defying it.  Yet Brown II, which ordered school desegregation “with all deliberate speed,” 
was so vague as to be meaningless.  This standard enabled segregationist judges to condone 
delay and evasion with ease, and it provided the few southern jurists who supported 
desegregation with no political cover.  
Even when controlling law is comparatively clear, however, rights litigation can only 
redress problems that are grounded in law.   The Court’s invalidation of all-white primaries 
meant little at a time when blacks in the Deep South still risked serious reprisals for attempting 
to vote.  School desegregation litigation ultimately had a limited integrative effect because of 
segregated housing patterns and white flight.  Even if courts had greater enforcement powers, 
their tendency to define constitutional rights as negative constraints on government rather than as 
entitlements to positive governmental intervention would limit the utility of rights litigation. 
Because white supremacy depended less on law than on entrenched social mores, economic 
power, ideology, and intimidation, the amount of racial reform that litigation could produce was 
inevitably limited.  
Judicial enforcement of rights is further undermined when resistance is geographically 
concentrated.  Roe v.  Wade (1973), which invalidated most criminal prohibitions on abortion, 
divided national opinion just as Brown did.  But opposition to Roe was spread throughout the 
nation rather than concentrated in one region.  Virtually all white southerners disagreed with 
Brown, and in the 1950s whites had most of the political, economic, social, and physical power 
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in the South.  This meant that virtually all officials who were responsible for enforcing Brown–
school board members, judges, jurors, politicians, and law enforcement officers–disagreed with 
it.  Such domination of the political and judicial machinery by a group so unified on the salient 
issue presents a formidable challenge to the enforcement of rights.
The contrast between Brown and Roe illuminates another factor relevant to the 
enforcement of emerging rights: market forces.  Regardless of how much opposition there was to 
abortion, capitalism ensured the development of a market to supply what those exercising the 
Roe right demanded: abortion services.  Brown created no comparable market opportunities 
because hardly any southern whites wanted grade school desegregation.  Anyone who 
established private integrated schools after Brown, performing a market function analogous to 
that of abortion clinics after Roe, would have done a very poor business indeed.
One potential conclusion is ironic and unsettling: judicial enforcement of rights is least 
effective when rights-bearers are most desperately in need.  Not only is the Court, which 
generally reflects prevailing social mores, unlikely to side with litigants who lack significant 
social standing, but even when such parties have established rights on their side, the power to 
enforce them is lacking.  When southern blacks were most oppressed, they were unable to bring 
suits to challenge the enormous, and obviously unconstitutional, racial disparities that existed in 
school funding.  Challenges to criminal convictions obtained in trials that were conducted while 
mobs surrounded the courthouses reached the Court only in the 1920s and 1930s, when racial 
conditions in the South had improved enough for liberal organizations to support such cases.  
Litigation requires willing lawyers, economic resources, and some measure of protection from 
majority hostility.  Because the truly oppressed are likely to have none of these things, the doors 
of the courts may as well be closed to them. 
Unpredictable Consequences of Court Decisions
Not only are court decisions sometimes difficult to enforce, but their consequences may 
be unpredictable or even counterproductive.  Indeed, many landmark Supreme Court rulings that 
protect rights have generated powerful political backlashes that have threatened to undermine 
those very rights.  Miranda v.  Arizona (1966) not only expanded the rights of criminal suspects 
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but also fueled Richard Nixon’s presidential election on a law-and-order platform, which in turn 
led to the appointment of federal judges who were less sympathetic to such rights.  Furman v.  
Georgia (1972), which invalidated arbitrary applications of the death penalty, apparently 
mobilized popular support for capital punishment; within four years of the ruling, thirty-five 
states had amended their death penalty statutes to address the Court’s constitutional qualms.  Roe 
v. Wade mobilized right-to-life opposition that had not previously played a significant role in 
American politics.  Within a few years of the Hawaii supreme court’s 1993 ruling that marriage 
could not be limited to heterosexuals, more than thirty states and Congress had passed “Defense 
of Marriage” acts.  
Brown produced precisely this sort of backlash.  As southern blacks, inspired by the 
Court’s ruling, filed school desegregation petitions and lawsuits, southern whites mobilized 
extraordinary resistance in response.  Southern politics moved dramatically to the right, racial 
moderates collapsed, and extremists prospered.  Progress in the areas of black voter registration, 
university desegregation, and the integration of athletic competitions was halted and then 
reversed.  Politicians used extremist rhetoric that encouraged violence; some of them, such as 
Bull Connor and Jim Clark, correctly calculated that the violent suppression of civil rights 
protests would win votes.  
Judicial decisions cause such backlashes because they disrupt the order in which social 
change might otherwise have occurred.  In the early 1950s, most southern blacks were more 
intent on securing voting rights, curbing police brutality, improving black schools, and winning 
access to decent jobs than to integrating grade schools.  Most southern whites shared a partially 
inverse hierarchy of racial preferences: They were far more resistant to desegregating grade 
schools than they were to making concessions on black voting or equalized school funding.  
Given these preferences, absent Brown, political negotiation between blacks and whites over 
racial reform was unlikely to have focused on grade school desegregation so soon.  But courts 
respond to agendas set by litigants, not politics.  By demanding change first in an area where 
whites were most recalcitrant, Brown incited massive resistance. 
Yet judicially induced backlashes may themselves have unpredictable consequences, thus 
further complicating efforts to assess the importance of civil rights decisions.  The white-on-
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black violence that Brown ignited, especially when directed at peaceful protestors and broadcast 
on national television, produced a counter-backlash.  In 1954 most northerners agreed with 
Brown in the abstract, but their support was too tepid to offset the determined resistance of 
southern whites.  It was the violence against peaceful civil rights demonstrators that transformed 
national opinion on race and led to the enactment of landmark civil rights legislation.
Rights that courts are likely to protect 
The complexities of defining rights that were discussed earlier enable courts to exercise 
broad discretion when deciding which rights to protect.  In the nineteenth century, courts were 
more likely to protect contract and property rights; in the second half of the twentieth century, 
they were more likely to protect the right of free speech and the right against racial 
discrimination.  Their discretion has never been unfettered, however, and contemporary public 
opinion–much more than conventional legal sources–significantly constrains judicial volition 
when it comes to defining rights.  For example, Supreme Court justices were not about to 
identify a right against racial segregation in public schools until the dramatic changes in racial 
attitudes and practices had swept the nation around World War II.
Yet the fact that public opinion constrains judicial discretion does not mean that it 
eliminates it.  Within the bounds set by contemporary culture, which rights are courts most likely 
to protect?  Much depends on the personal predispositions of judges.  When southerners and 
Democrats controlled the antebellum Court, the justices protected the rights of slave owners to 
the return of fugitive slaves and to carry slaves into federal territories without interference from 
the national government.  New Deal Democrats favored the free speech rights of labor unions 
and of racial and religious minorities.  Over the past  two decades, conservative Republicans on 
the Court have favored the rights of whites not to be disadvantaged by affirmative action and 
minority voting districts, the right of property owners to be compensated for regulatory 
interferences with the value of their land, and the right of organizations such as the Boy Scouts to 
exclude people based on their sexual orientation.
Though judges are likely to protect rights that resonate with their own values, those 
values are not a random sample of those held by Americans at a particular point in time.  Judges 
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are not perfect mirrors of contemporary society.  At a minimum, they differ from average 
Americans in three ways: They are more likely to be lawyers, to be well educated, and to be 
relatively affluent.  These systemic differences undoubtedly influence the sorts of rights that 
courts deem worthy of protection.  Lawyers tend to value judicial process, and judges have 
historically been more protective of the procedural rights of criminal defendants than has the 
public at large.  Opinion polls reveal that well-educated people have significantly different–that 
is, more liberal–attitudes toward abortion, school prayer, and gay rights than ordinary 
Americans.  Thus, even after three decades of Court appointments by mostly Republican 
presidents, the justices remain more willing to protect abortion rights, to ban school prayer, and 
to invalidate anti-gay legislation than is the average American.  Finally, affluent people are more 
likely to oppose wealth redistribution than are average citizens.  Over the course of American 
history, the Supreme Court has frequently checked legislative efforts to redistribute wealth; on 
the very rare occasions when it has mandated redistribution, it has done so only in the mildest of 
forms.
In the end, courts may be more inclined and better able to protect some rights than others.  
But the overall contours of freedom in American society are more dependent on public opinion 
than on judicial rulings.  Most of the rights that courts choose to protect are solidly supported by 
public opinion.  On the few occasions when this is not so, judicial enforcement is unlikely to be 
efficacious.  The great jurist Learned Hand had it just about right:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws 
and upon courts.  These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes.  Liberty lies in 
the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can 
save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.  While it lies there 
it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.  
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